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While one would be hard pressed to find any indication of it on the official Kremlin 
website, Dmitri Medvedev was elected president of Russia on Sunday, March 2 
with 70.23 percent of the vote.  There were, of course, voting irregularities, as 
noted by the sole independent Russian monitoring organization, Golos, whose 
monitors were denied access to polling stations, and even 
arrested.  Golos director Lilia Shibanova suggested that the poll results be 
considered "with great, great misgivings." The violations, and subsequent 
crackdown on election protesters, were unfathomable and unnecessary, given 
that the vote seemed to reflect opinion polls. (1)  As a Moscow Times article 
noted, the elections were "not free, not fair, but accurate." (2) 
 
Prior to the elections, the "staffs" of each leader puzzled over the correct margin 
of victory for Medvedev:  Putin supporters worried that a Medvedev electoral poll 
that topped Putin's winning percentage in 2004 would be unseemly; at 
Medvedev's campaign headquarters, the aspirations were for bigger 
numbers.  (3) Somehow, the "actual" results seem to have split the 
difference.  Putin's percentage (71.3) was larger in 2004, but given the increase 
in the number of voters, Medvedev received more votes. (4) Just the way the 
numbers broke.  Really. 
 
President Vladimir Putin and President-elect Dmitri Medvedev have worked 
together for many years and admire and trust each other immensely. At least that 
is what each man tirelessly intones. The inherent contradictions of a two-headed 
power structure aside, their arrangement could succeed if one or the other 
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accepted a "junior" role in the partnership; unfortunately, neither man seems 
prepared to play that part. 
 
Medvedev has emphasized the constitutional structure of the Russian political 
landscape as being strongly weighted towards the president: "Our country has 
been and will remain a presidential republic.  There is no other option." (5) Putin 
insists, "the highest executive power in the country is in the hands of the 
Government." (6) 
 
While a new president traditionally is accorded a "honeymoon," perhaps it is this 
dual power structure that will be allowed a certain grace period to see how these 
two Russian presidents adjust to power sharing.  While Medvedev has made 
clear that Putin will be his choice as prime minister, the actual appointment 
probably will not be made until after the inauguration in May.  According to the 
constitution, the prime minister "not later than a week after appointment [the 
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation] shall submit to the 
President…proposals on the structure of the federal bodies of executive power." 
(7) Just how Putin envisages the structure of the government will reveal a great 
deal about the future of this power sharing agreement.  However, Russian 
authorities have not proven to be great institutional architects; it is the 
personalities in the circles surrounding the leaders that have been crucial through 
both Yel'tsin's and Putin's administrations.  Thus, in evaluating even the early 
stages of a Medvedev presidency and the fate of this unorthodox diarchy, it well 
may be that the cadres decide everything. 
 
The process of nominating members to the boards of major corporations 
demonstrates thus far, that many of Putin's top aides and advisors appear to be 
maintaining their posts atop Russia's most profitable and influential 
companies:  Igor Sechin at Rosneft; Viktor Ivanov at Aeroflot; and Sergei Ivanov 
at Unified Aviation Corporation. (8)  The notable change is at Gazprom, where 
the president-elect will relinquish his seat to the outgoing Prime Minister, Viktor 
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Zubkov.  More changes are likely, but many boards of Russian state corporations 
have until the end of June to resolve their leadership issues, and by then, 
Medvedev may decide to take a more hands-on approach to personnel matters 
within and without the Kremlin.  (9)  Of course, Medvedev also is on record about 
the need to separate high-level officials from corporate positions: "I think there is 
no reason for the majority of state officials to sit on the boards of those firms." 
(10) 
 
A quick glance at Medvedev's career suggests that his personnel choices, 
provided he is allowed to staff the Kremlin under his power-sharing agreement 
with Putin, will shift away from such a heavy emphasis on former security 
services members and more to colleagues from his law student days and also 
from his time at the offices of then St. Petersburg Mayor, the late Anatoli 
Sobchak.  The crowd of St. Petersburgers from Putin's staff selections may 
remain, or Medvedev's clique might have their own preferred colleagues from the 
north. 
 
A glimpse at likely Medvedev loyalists was provided by a published report of the 
individuals who celebrated his victory with him:  Sergei Sobyanin, Medvedev's 
campaign manager who replaced Medvedev as Kremlin Chief of Staff in 2005; 
Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff and Nashifounder Vladislav Surkov; the 
irrepressible Aleksandr Voloshin (Chief of Staff to Yel'tsin and to Putin, at which 
time he was Medvedev's boss); and several individuals who are also close to 
Putin, including the successor also-ran, Sergei Ivanov, Putin's super-reformer 
Dmitri Kozak, and United Russia leader Boris Gryzlov. (11) 
 
There is some speculation that Medvedev will not have oversight of key 
personnel appointments during the early phase of his presidency.  Currently, 
Putin associate Viktor Ivanov is charged with personnel decisions in the Kremlin, 
but it is unlikely that Medvedev would allow members of the outgoing 
administration to regulate his authority in personnel matters.  According to 
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Voloshin, "The way I see it…the president will wield all powers specified by the 
Constitution. … I do not perceive any attempts to usurp these powers or shift 
them to the government.  The president will be supreme commander-in-chief of 
the Armed Forces and as such, he will control security structures." (12) 
 
There are many Kremlin apparatchiki who have been extremely influential 
throughout the Putin presidency.  An interesting gauge of the success of the 
Medvedev-Putin leadership team may be the ability for these individuals to "leave 
the public sector and go to work in the private sector,"  (13) as Medvedev has 
suggested, or perhaps, to seek shelter in the belyi dom and bloat the government 
offices of a Putin premiership. 
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